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III.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment and the lower
court's subsequent denial of Chanhmany's Motion for an Additur or
in the alternative a new trial.

Chanhmany also appeals the lower

court's order striking her general damages award.
uncontested

evidence showed that Chanhmany

Although the

sustained more than

$3,000 in medical expenses resulting from an automobile accident,
the jury awarded only $2,100 as reasonable compensation for her
medical expenses.
In Chanhmany1s opening brief, she argued that the lower
court's denial of her motion for an additur or a new trial lacked
a reasonable basis because:

(1)

Based

on the uncontested

and

overwhelming evidence, reasonable minds could only conclude that
Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses.

(2)

To

award less than $3,000 in medical expenses, the jury disregarded
uncontested evidence. (3)

The threshold statute does not justify

striking the general damages award because whether Chanhmany met
the medical expense threshold was not a trial issue. The threshold
issue was not presented to the jury.

In addition, Utah Code Ann.

§ 31A-22-307 provides the procedure for resolving a threshold issue
dispute.

Neither party followed the procedure because threshold

medical damages simply was not a trial issue.
Chanhmany also said that her general damage award should
not have been stricken because based on the evidence, reasonable
1

minds must conclude that Chanhmany is permanently disabled.

Both

sides medical experts testified that Chanhmany was permanently
impaired.
disabled.
Chanhmany

Chanhmany's

medical

expert

concluded

that

she

was

Bone's medical expert did not challenge that conclusion.
and

her

co-workers

explained

how

the

impairment

restricted her work and lifestyle activities. At the conclusion of
the evidence, the trial court judge was convinced Chanhmany was
disabled and entitled to compensation.

Thus, the jury was not

instructed on the threshold issue of disability, nor were they
asked to determine whether Chanhmany was permanently disabled.
In addition, Chanhmany
product of prejudice.

showed

that the verdict

is a

The jury's disregard of the uncontested

evidence coupled with the unreasonably low verdict and admissions
by jurors on voir dire, all establish that the verdict was a
product of prejudice against chiropractic treatment.
Finally, Chanhmany said the lower court denied her a
constitutional

right to a jury trial on the disability

issue.

Chanhmany noted the determination of disability is a question of
fact and explained that the Court by not presenting the issue to
the jury and then necessarily concluding that Chanhmany was not
disabled when the court struck the general damages award, denied
her the right of a jury trial on this important factual issue.
In response, Defendant Bone says that Chanhmany failed to
plead and prove that she met the medical expense threshold set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (e) and that the jury could and
2

did reasonably find that Chanhmany's necessary medical expenses
were

less than

$3,000

(Appellee's Brief

pp.

11 - 13).

Bone

mistakenly relies on case law from Colorado, Pennsylvania and New
York, states which have no fault statutes different than Utah's,
for the proposition that whether threshold is met is a jury issue
upon which the plaintiff has the burden of proof.

Bone ignores

Utah case law which inescapably leads to a different conclusion.
Bone also ignores the procedural context of this case.
since

neither

party

questioned

whether

Chanhmany

That is,
sustained

threshold medical expenses, they did not avail themselves of the
procedure

in

Utah

Code

Ann.

§31A-22~307.

Nor

was

the

jury

instructed or asked to rule on any threshold issue.
Bone also says that Chanhmany failed to prove and plead
permanent disability. (Appellee's Brief pp. 16 - 19).
doing

so,

Bone

ignores

all

the

uncontested

unquestionably requires a different conclusion.

Again, in

evidence

which

Bone also ignores

the trial judge's conclusion arrived at prior to submitting the
case to the jury that Chanhmany was disabled

and entitled

to

compensation.
Finally,

Bone

says that

Chanhmany

cannot

appeal

the

disability issue and her denial of a jury trial on the disability
issue because she did not submit a jury instruction on permanent
disability (Appellee's Brief, pp. 21 - 23).
This reply brief responds to each of Bone's arguments.

3

IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHANHMANY DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN OF PLEADING AND
PROVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENTS
Chanhmany
proving

threshold

does
medical

not have
expenses

the

burden

of

pleading

for numerous reasons.

and
The

threshold statute is an affirmative defense. Allstate v. Ivie, 606
P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1980).

Bone has the burden of proving the

elements triggering the limited immunity granted by the statute.
In addition, threshold medical expenses was not a jury issue.

The

jury was not asked to find whether Chanhmany sustained medical
expenses exceeding $3,000, nor were they told what would happen if
they found that she did not.

POINT II
BY NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THRESHOLD DAMAGES AND
THRESHOLD DISABILITY, BONE WAIVED THESE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES
Bone

correctly

affirmative defense.

pled

the

threshold

statute

as

an

However, he failed to submit his affirmative

defense to the jury via a jury instruction or special verdict.

By

failing to present his defense theory to the jury, Bone waived the
limited immunity defenses provided by Utah's Threshold Statute.

4

POINT III
CHANHMANY PLEAD AND TROVED THRESHOLD MEDICAL
EXPENSES EXCEEDING $3,000
Regardless

of

who

has

the

burden

of

proof

on

the

threshold damage issue, the trial evidence conclusively showed that
Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses resulting
from the auto accident.

Bone's argument that a portion of the

expenses may be due to Chanhmany's second pregnancy, is unsupported
speculation and contrary to the direct testimony of all medical
experts in this case.

POINT IV
CHANHMANY PLED AND PROVED THRESHOLD DISABILITY
Although Chanhmany does not have the burden of proving
that she is permanently disabled as a result of the auto accident,
she did so.

Contrary to the argument in Bone's Brief, a permanent

impairment is roughly equivalent to a permanent disability.
medical experts testified Chanhmany was permanently impaired.

Both
In

addition, there is uncontradicted testimony establishing how the
auto accident altered Chanhmany's capacity to meet personal, social
and occupational needs and requirements.

Based on the evidence,

the trial court concluded that Chanhmany was disabled and entitled
to

some

compensation.

For

that

reason

only,

disability issue was not presented to the jury.

5

the

permanent

POINT V
CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
ON THE THRESHOLD DISABILITY ISSUE
It is true that a failure to object to a jury instruction
omission waives the litigants right to appeal the Court's failure
to give the instruction.

In fact, when Bone failed to object to no

threshold disability instruction, the effect was that the limited
immunity defense provided by the threshold statute was waived, and
Chanhmany certainly has no objection to that. However, Chanhmany"s
appeal is not based on the Court f s failure to instruct on the
threshold

disability

issue.

following conduct deprived
issue:

(1)

Rather,

Chanhmany

says

that

the

her of a jury trial on the disability

Prior to instructing the jury, the Court concluded

that Chanhmany was permanently disabled.

(2) Since disability was

no longer an issue, the Court correctly did not instruct the jury
that

it

disabled.
general

had

to

(3)
damage

determine

whether

Chanhmany

When the Court subsequently
award,

the

Court

was

permanently

struck the modest

necessarily

concluded

that

Chanhmany was not permanently disabled.
POINT VI
CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO APPEAL A VERDICT
RESULTING FROM PREJUDICE
Chanhmany did not waive her right to appeal the verdict
on the basis that the verdict is a product of prejudice against
chiropractic treatment.

In voir dire, two jurors indicated some

bias against chiropractors.

However, Chanhmany did not move to
6

exclude the two jurors.

Had Chanhmany based her appeal on the

argument that it was improper for the two individuals to serve as
jurors, Bone would be correct in arguing that Chanhmany waived her
right to exclude them.

However, passing a jury for cause does not

waive a litigant's right to subsequently appeal a jury verdict
based on jury prejudice.
VI.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHANHMANY DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN OF PLEADING AND
PROVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENTS
A.

The Defendant, Not Chanhmany. Has the Burden of Proof on a
Threshold Damages Issue.
The fundamental theme of Bone's Brief is that Chanhmany

(the Plaintiff) and not Bone
proof on threshold issues.

(the Defendant) has the burden of

Bone's theme is fundamentally wrong.

Over 21 states have adopted no-fault automobile insurance statutes.
Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Utah 1980).
statutes,

such as those cited

Some of the

in Bone's Brief, hold that the

"statutory threshold is an essential condition of a plaintiff's
right to recover . . . and the plaintiff therefore has the burden
of proving facts which establish that one of the threshold criteria
has been met".
App. 1992)

E.g. Pinell v. McCrary, 849 P. 2d 848, 850 (Colo.

(cited in Bone's Brief, pp. 10-13, 16; See Grand v.

7

Durst, 482 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Supr. 1984) (cited in Bone's Brief, pp.
10, 12) .
However, Utah's threshold statute, as construed by the
appellate courts, does not create another element a plaintiff must
prove to prevail on a negligence claim.

Rather, if a defendant,

like Bone, has no-fault insurance coverage he is granted limited
statutory tort immunity.

As explained in Allstate v. Ivie, supra

at 1200:
[T]he no-fault insurance act confers two
privileges: First, he is granted partial tort
immunity. . . .
He does, however, remain
liable for customary tort claims . . . where
the threshold provisions . . . are met.
Limited

statutory

immunity,

like

any

other

matter,

constituting an avoidance, is an affirmative defense which must be
pled and proved by a defendant, not the plaintiff.

Bowman v. Octden

City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561 (1908); (City court waived detailed
nature of claim.)

Green v. James, 473 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1973);

Maul v. Costan, 928 F.2d

784, 786

(7th Cir. 1991).

See also

Shoreline Dev. , Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992) .
Moreover,

if

the

threshold

requirement

was

a

claim

element a plaintiff must prove, then the Utah Court of Appeals
could

not

have

held

as

it

did

in

Jepson

v.

State

Dept.

of

Corrections, 846 P. 2d 485, 487 (Utah App. 1993) that the statute of
limitations for filing a notice of claim with a governmental entity
begins to run when the accident occurs, rather than when the
injured sustains $3,000 medical damages.
8

Ordinarily, a statute of

limitations begin to run when the last element of the tort claim
occurs.

E.g. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv. I n c .

794 P. 2d 11 (Utah 1990).

Hence, if the threshold requirement was

a claim element with the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the
statute of limitations in Jepson, would not have commenced running
until the plaintiff sustained $3,000 in medical expenses.
In

addition,

Bone

in his

pleadings

threshold requirement is an affirmative defense.

admits

that

the

Bone plead in his

answer the threshold statute as his "Sixth Defense" (R. 19 - 20) .
In summary, Chanhmany does not have the burden of proving
she sustained in excess of $3,000 medical expenses.

Bone has the

burden of proving Chanhmany did not meet threshold requirements.
As hereinafter
opening

shown in this brief and Point I of Chanhmany's

brief, the proof was contrary

to Bone's burden.

The

evidence is overwhelming that Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000
in medical expenses.

Thus, the lower court's failure to grant a

new trial, or in the alternative, an additur, lacked a reasonable
basis and must be reversed.
B.

Whether Chanhmany Sustained $3,000 in Medical Expenses Was Not
a Trial Issue.
Another erroneous albeit companion theme of Bone's Brief

is that whether Chanhmany met threshold requirements was for the
jury to decide and the jury correctly decided against her.
In support of his argument, Bone again relies on cases
from jurisdictions with no fault statutes different than Utah's.
9

However,

Utah's

no

fault

statute

does

threshold issue be submitted to the jury.
is

unique.

To

create

a

uniform

not

require

that

the

Instead, Utah's statute

application

of

the

statute

throughout the state, section 31A-22-307 requires a relative value
study of medical expenses and accommodations. Compensation Systems
and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 173 Utah L. Rev. 383, 391.
statute

then

provides

a

formula

for

applying

the

study

The
to a

particular case. (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (2) (d)) . If threshold
damage is a disputed issue, the statute provides that the court or
either party may move to designate an impartial medical panel of
not more than three licensed physicians to testify.
neither party or the judge requested the panel.
stipulated

to

the

admission

of

Chanhmany's

In this case,
Instead, they

medical

totalling $3,299.09. (R. 277, 289, lines 14 - 15).

expenses

The parties'

decision not to seek a medical panel and their stipulation of
medical expense evidence shows that threshold medical expenses was
not a trial issue.
C.

The Jury Was Not Asked to Determine Whether Chanhmany Met the
Threshold Requirements of Utah Code Ann. 5 31A-22-309(e).
In this case, Chanhmany need not prove threshold medical

expenses because the issue was never submitted to the jury.

The

one and only requirement or issue set forth in Section 31A-22309(e)

is whether the

injured person

"has sustained.

medical expenses . . . in excess of $3,000."

. . (e)

However, the jury was

not asked to determine whether Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000
10

in medical expenses, nor were they told what would happen if they
did

not

expenses.

find

that

she

sustained

more

than

$3,000

in medical

Instead, the jury was asked to determine a different

issue, i.e., What amount should be awarded to reasonably compensate
Chanhmany for her medical expenses?

(Jury Instructions 28 - 29

3 22, 32 3 Copy set forth in the addenda; Special Verdict

R.

R. 34 2 -

343) .
Chanhmany's appeal is not based on the Court's failure to
give a jury instruction or verdict requiring the jury to decide
whether Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses.
Instead, Chanhmany's appeal is based on the fact that whether an
injured person meets the Section 3.09(e) threshold requirements was
not a jury issue.

The court's subsequent reliance on the jury's

finding of a different issue to strike the general damage award
lacks a reasonable basis and should be reversed.
POINT II
BY NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THRESHOLD DAMAGES AND
THRESHOLD DISABILITY, BONE WAIVED THESE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES
As set forth in Point I of this reply brief, Utah's
threshold statute grants automobile accident defendants a limited
statutory immunity which must be pled and proved by the defendant.
Bone plead the threshold issue (R. 19 - 20). However, he did not
request the Court to submit a threshold defense jury instruction.
Neither did he submit a verdict form which required the jury to
determine

whether

Chanhmany
11

was

permanently

disabled.

The purpose of jury instructions is to set forth the
legal theories of both parties.

E.g. Elkincrton v. Foust, 618 P. 2d

37 (Utah 1980), if they are supported by the evidence.
Gene's

Bldg.

Materials,

Specifically,

if

a

567

defendant

P.2d
wants

174,
the

176

jury

Powers v.

(Utah
to

1977).

consider

an

affirmative defense, he must tender a sufficient jury instruction.
U.R.C.P. 51; Alta Mutual Ins. Co. v. Northincrton, 561 So.2d 1041,
1047

(Ala.

1990),

(failure

to

instruct

on

punitive

damages

standards) ; C.F. John Call Engineering v. Manti City, 795 P. 2d 682,
684 (Utah App. 1990) (mitigation defense instruction should have
been withheld); Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975), (plaintiff waived instruction on burden of proof).
In this case, Bone failed to present any instruction on
threshold

immunity.

instruction.

He did not present a threshold

disability

He did not present a threshold damages instruction.

As set forth in Appellee's Brief pages 19 through 20, the failure
to propose an instruction, waives the claim or defense,
POINT III
CHANHMANY PLEAD AND PROVED THRESHOLD MEDICAL
EXPENSES EXCEEDING $3,000
A.

The $3,000 Threshold Requirement.
As set forth in Point I, the one and only requirement of

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(e) is whether the injured person "has
sustained
$3,000."

. . . (e) medical expenses to a person in excess of
The

statute

does

not
12

require

that

the

expenses

be

reasonable.

If a party wishes to challenge the reasonable cost, he

proceeds under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(2) (d) .

Moreover, the

term "medical expenses" is broadly defined to "include expenses for
any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance
with a recognized religious method of healing."

Utah Code Ann. §

31A-22-307(3).
B.

The Proof.
Although Chanhmany doesn't have the burden of pleading

and proving threshold medical expenses, she clearly proved she
sustained medical expenses in excess of $3,000.
marshalled

in Pages

The evidence is

14 - 16 of Chanhmany1 s Brief.

The only

evidence offered at trial consists of copies of medical expenses
totalling $3,299.09 broken down as follows:
Gold Cross Ambulance
Holy Cross Hospital
FHP

$

Dr. Gary Whitley (Chiropractor)

158.09
256.00
469.00
2,416.00

TOTAL

$3,299.09

(Summary Page of Exhibit P-3, copy attached in the addendum),
together with testimony of three witnesses, Chanhmany, Dr. Whitley
(Chanhmany's
expert).

medical

expert)

and

Dr.

Moress

(Bone's

medical

None of them testified that Chanhmany did not sustain in

excess of $3,000 in medical expenses.

Quite the opposite.

See

Chanhmany 1 s Brief pp. 1 4 - 1 6 .
In response, Bone says that the

jury could

conclude

differently because part of the chiropractic care could have been
13

necessitated by Chanhmany's subsequent second pregnancy and/or her
failure to continue with exercises prescribed by Dr. Whitley.

Bone

concludes "The jury was free to assimilate this evidence . . . and
determine that some or all of the treatments incurred were not
related

to

the

accident

mitigated her damages."

.

.

.

[and] that

plaintiff

had

not

Bone's Brief pp. 1 4 - 1 5 .

Thus, the narrow question is whether viewing the evidence
in totality,

could

reasonable minds

conclude

that

at

least a

portion of the chiropractic treatment expenses were incurred as a
result of the pregnancy or failure to exercise?

The uncontested

testimony shows that they could not.
Chanhmany testified she does the exercises prescribed by
Dr. Whitley.

(Transcript of Proceedings April 2 7 - 2 9 , 1993, p. 78

lines 11 - 15, hereinafter "Tr. p.

") .

When she subsequently

testified that she did not do the exercises, she explained that she
misunderstood the second question.

(Tr. p. 89 lines 13 - 15).

Chanhmany testified that prior to the accident she had
never had any neck or back pain despite an earlier pregnancy.
pp. 63 lines 20 - 21; 72 lines 12 - 22) .

(Tr.

She now has chronic back

pain and a numbness in her shoulder. (Tr. pp. 7 3 - 76).
The medical notes of Dr. Penny, the FHP physician show
that the reason chiropractic treatment was interrupted was because
of Chanhmany's inability to compensate the chiropractor.
355, lines 6 - 22). There is no conflicting testimony.
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(Tr. p.

Dr. Whitley testified that on taking her medical history,
examining her x-rays and conducting a physical examination, he
diagnosed

Chanhmany

as

having

a

sprained

back

together

with

ligament, muscle and nerve damage caused by the auto accident.
(Tr. pp. 128 - 129) . He testified that he treats a lot of these
injuries.

(Tr. p. 129 lines 17 - 18) . When Chanhmany returned for

treatment, she did not report any new trauma, and she explained
that she still had pain from her injury.

(Tr. p. 135).

Although

Dr. Whitley testified that pregnancy could aggravate Chanhmany's
injuries, he concluded that the back pain and numbness experienced
by Chanhmany was still due to the accident:
MR. WELLS:

Q. Did you consider yourself still treating
the original injury?
A. That was still what I felt was the reason why
she still had the problem.

(Tr. p. 135, lines. 16 - 19).
* * *

MR. WELLS:

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
the complaint Chanhmany has made over the
period of time that you have treated her
relate to a particular trauma.
A. I would say it would
accident.

stem back to the car

(Tr. p. 174, lines. 15 - 20).
Bone's medical expert, a neurologist, also testified in
support

of

Dr.

Whitley's

conclusion.

Moress

testified

that

Chanhmany had lower back strain and shoulder numbness. (Tr. pp. 217
- 218). Based on these two injuries, he gave her a 6.8% impairment
15

rating.

He testified that Chanhmanyfs impairment

(Tr. p. 230).

was due to the auto accident.

He did not testify that it was due

to a second pregnancy.
MR. WELLS:

Q. Okay.

And so in your opinion Khai Chanhmany

is 6.8% less than normal.
A. That is correct.
MR. WELLS:

Q. And

that's

because

of

the

injury

from

the

accident?
A. Yes.
(Tr. p. 235, lines. 19 - 21, 24 - 25; p. 236, In. 1 ) .
In summary, medical experts from both sides testified
that Chanhmany f s injuries were due to the auto accident.
expert

concluded

treatment.

Chanhmanyfs

second

pregnancy

Neither

necessitated

The medical testimony coupled with Chanhmany's direct

testimony and her medical history all conclusively show that she
did not require chiropractic treatment as a result of her second
pregnancy.
In

summary,

Bone's

claim

that

part

of

incurred with Dr. Whitley could have resulted

the

expenses

from the second

pregnancy is nothing but unsupported speculation.

Thus, the jury

could not and did not find that a portion of her chiropractic
treatment was due to her second pregnancy.

The fact finder is not

allowed to disregard unimpeached, uncontradicted testimony. Rowdin
v. Stanley, 455 F.2d 482, 484
University

Federal

Credit

(10th Cir. 1972), Smith v. Idaho

Union,

760

P.2d

19

(Idaho

1988).

Moreover, even if there is a smattering of evidence supporting a
16

finding, it will be reversed if an examination of the evidence in
totality, leads the reviewing court to conclude that a mistake has
been made.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564

(1985),

Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 124, (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In this case, taking the evidence as a whole leads to
only one conclusion. The chiropractic treatments and expenses were
sustained as a result of the auto accident. For this reason, the
orders denying a new trial and striking the general damages each
lacked a reasonable basis and should be reversed.
POINT IV
CHANHMANY PLED AND PROVED THRESHOLD DISABILITY
A.

Introduction - Appellee's Brief.
Incredibly, Bone says that Chanhmany failed to prove a

permanent disability. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 15-17).

Bone admits

that Chanhmany was permanently impaired but argues:
In this case, no evidence was ever introduced
which attempted to correlate the medical
findings of impairment with an assessment in
[sic] their impact on Plaintiff's lifestyle,
earning
capacity
or
job
functions
(disability).
(Id. at 17).
Bone also says that no objective evidence of a disability was ever
presented to the two medical experts or the jury.
As

hereinafter

demonstrated,

evidence that Chanhmany was disabled.
she was not.

there

was

overwhelming

There is no evidence that

The Court's failure to submit the disability issue to
17

the jury was not due to a lack of disability evidence, but instead
was due to the fact that disability was not a contested

trial

issue.
B.

The Threshold Disability Requirement.
A person injured in an automobile accident may maintain

a cause of action if he sustains a "(c) permanent disability"

Utah

Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) (c) .
Utah's no fault statute does not define what a "permanent
disability" is.
term.

However, Utah's appellate courts have defined the

Although, this court would not know it from reading Bone's

brief, the authority Bone cites holds that a permanent impairment
is

often

the

sole

or

real

criteria

of

permanent

disability.

Northwest Carriers v. Ind. Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140.fn.3 (Utah
1981) (cited in Appellee's Brief pp. 16 - 17).
Similarly,

for

threshold

purposes

other

states

have

defined a permanent disability as a permanent injury. E.g. Elliott
V. Simon, 385 A.2d 249, 250 (N.J. 1978).
AMA Guidelines define a disability as an alteration of an
individual's capacity to meet personal, social or
demands

or

to

meet

statutory

or

regulatory

occupational
requirements.

(Appellee's Brief p. 17).
Finally, amended Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(c) , treats
permanent disability as equivalent to a permanent impairment based
upon objective findings.

An objective finding is what "you can

IS

objectively look at in or measure it or feel it.11

(Tr. p. 138,

lines. 4-5).
C.

The Only Reason the Jury was not Presented the Disability
Issue Was Because the Parties' Medical Experts and the Court
Concluded That Chanhmany Was Permanently Disabled and . The
Only Dispute was the Extent of the Disability.
Contrary to the unsupported assertion in Bone f s brief,

lack

of disability

evidence was not the reason

disability issue was not presented to the jury.
was

not

asked

to

determine

whether

the

threshold

Rather, the jury

Chanhmany

met

threshold

disability because the evidence of disability was so overwhelming
that there was no cause to submit the issue to the jury.

In a

conference with counsel held well in advance of instructing the
jury, the Court concluded that Chanhmany was injured, disabled, and
entitled to compensation.

The only issue left for the jury to

decide was how much:
THE COURT:

It has been established by both doctors that
there's an injury . . . they both assigned a
rate of disability. One is 5 percent and the
other is 12 percent. The jury is to make the
determination between five percent and twelve
percent. . . .

(Tr. p. 269 lines 2 - 8 ) .
If the Court or the parties had any question of whether
Chanhmany was disabled, the threshold disability issue would have
been presented to the jury.

The fact that the Court did not do so,

and the parties did not request the court to do so shows that at
the conclusion of the evidence, there was no dispute as to whether

Chanhmany was disabled.
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D.

The Disability Proof.
1.

Evidence of an alteration in Chanhmany's capacity
to meet personal/ social and occupational demands.

Contrary to the unsupported allegations in Bone's brief,
there was plenty of evidence showing that the accident
Chanhmanyfs

altered

occupational demands.

ability

to

meet

personal,

injury

social

and

Chanhmany testified that she was no longer

able to lift 50 pound totes at work. (Tr. pp. 76, 77).

Her co-

workers said the same thing. (Tr. p. 260) . She was transferred to
a different job.

(Tr. pp. 76 Ins 19 - 24, 90 lines 20 - 25).

Chanhmany has difficulty in lifting laundry and groceries. (Tr. p.
77).

She can no longer participate in sports. (Tr. p. 79 lines 21

- 25).
78

Exercises are difficult.

lines

3 -

10) .

She cannot do sit ups.

There was no contrary

testimony.

(Tr. p.
It is

impossible therefore to marshall any conflicting evidence because
there is none, the foregoing evidence clearly establishes that
Chanhmany has had an alteration of her capacity to meet personal,
social and occupational demands.
2.

Evidence of a permanent impairment or injury based
on objective findings.

As set forth in Chanhmany*s opening brief, there is no
question
medical

that
expert

rating.
permanent

Chanhmany
gave her

is permanently
a

12 percent whole

(Tr. p. 148 - 150).
impairment

rating

impaired.
person

Chanhmanyfs
impairment

Bone's medical expert assigned a
of

6.8

percent.

Bone

apparently

concedes that Chanhmany is impaired but grumbles that there was no
20

objective evidence upon which the permanent impairment ratings were
based so Chanhmany was not permanently disabled. (Appellee's Brief
p. 21).

In making this argument, Bone is playing with semantics.

As stated in Northwest Carrier v. Ind. Commission, 639 P. 2d 138 140
(Utah 1981), a "permanent impairment, is in fact the sole or real
criterion

of permanent disability

acknowledged".

far more often than readily

More importantly, however, the record discloses

that Bone's argument is factually incorrect.

Applying the AMA

Guidelines, Dr. Whitley objectively measured Chanhmanyfs range of
motion and concluded that it was restricted.
144) .

In

addition,

after

conducting

a

(Tr. pp. 109, 110 and
battery

of

medically

objective tests, Dr. Whitley concluded that Chanhmanyfs impairment
was 12.8 percent.

(Tr. pp. 138, 139, 143 - 148 and 149).
POINT V

CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
ON THE THRESHOLD DISABILITY ISSUE
Bone, in his brief, argues that Chanhmany waived her
right to a jury trial on the disability issue because she did not
propose a jury instruction or a verdict containing the threshold
disability issue. (Appellee's Brief, p. 23).
There are at least three reasons for rejecting Bone's
argument.

First, threshold damages is an affirmative defense which

was waived when Bone failed to submit a jury instruction or verdict
containing the threshold damages issue.

21

(See Point II).

Second,

the

only

reason

a threshold

disability

jury

instruction wasn't proposed was because the Court concluded prior
to instructing the jury that Chanhmany was disabled and entitled to
compensation.

Hence, there was no threshold damage issue to submit

to the jury.
Finally, Bone misconstrues Chanhmanyfs appeal. Chanhmany
is not arguing that a new trial should be awarded because the judge
failed to give a jury instruction.

What Chanhmany does contend and

Bone fails to acknowledge, is that if the threshold disability
affirmative defense is going to be considered, the defense should
have been considered by the jury.
jury

the

disability

issue

by

The Court can not take from the
concluding

that

Chanhmany

was

disabled, not instructing the jury on the disability issue, and
then subsequently changing its mind after the jury renders its
verdict.

Plainly

and

simply

put,

the

threshold

disability

affirmative defense was not an issue, but if it was an issue, it
was an issue for the jury to decide.
POINT VI
CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO APPEAL A VERDICT
RESULTING FROM PREJUDICE
In her opening

brief, Chanhmany

argued

that she was

entitled to a new trial because the verdict results from prejudice.
Chanhmany supported her argument by citing the low verdict, the
jury's disregard of competent evidence, and answers of two jurors
in voir dire.

In response, Bone effectively
22

says that

since

Chanhmany did not challenge either of the two jurors, but instead
passed the jury for cause, Chanhmany waived her right to appeal.
However,

Chanhmany's

composition of the jury.

appeal

is

not

based

on

the

She does not say that a juror challenged

for cause was allowed to sit.

She did not say that a Court

required her to exercise a preemptory challenge to exclude a juror
that should have been excluded for cause.

If she had, then Bone

would be correct in asserting that Chanhmany waived her right to
challenge the composition of the jury.
However, Chanhmany has not challenged the composition of
the jury, she's challenging its verdict.

A small damage award can

and will be set aside if the jury's verdict results from passion or
prejudice.
low

U.R.C.P. 59(a)(5).

verdict,

the

jury's

Evidence of prejudice includes a

disregard

of

competent

evidence, and answers to questions on voir dire.

uncontested

With regard to

the latter, Chanhmany is not arguing on the basis of a juror's
answer that the juror should have been excluded.

What she does

submit is that the answer disclosing some bias, which, when coupled
with

the

low verdict

and

the disregard

of

competent

demonstrates that the verdict is the product of prejudice.
the

damages

award

is

the

product

of

prejudice,

evidence
Because

Chanhmany

is

entitled to have the verdict set aside and to be awarded a new
trial.

23

VII.
CONCLUSION
Chanhmany

does

not have

the

burden

of

proving threshold damages or threshold disability.

pleading

and

Bone does.

However, regardless of who has the burden of proof, the marshalled
evidence shows that Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical
expenses and she is permanently disabled.
submit

an

instruction

affirmative

defense

on

offered

threshold

Moreover, by failing to

issues,

by the threshold

Bone

waived

statute.

the

Hence,

threshold damages was not an issue nor was threshold disability.
In addition, Chanhmany did not waive her right appeal the verdict
on the basis of prejudice.

She also did not waive her right to a

jury trial on all factual issues.

For each of these reasons,

Chanhmany should be awarded a new-trial.
DATED this

J0

day of July, 1994.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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APPENDIX
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2.

Jury Instructions 28 - 29.
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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 1

MEDICAL BILLS SUMMARY
KHAI CHANHMANY

GOLD CROSS AMBULANCE

$

158.09

HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL

256.00

FHP

469.00
2.416.00

DR. GARY WHITLEY
TOTAL

$3.299.09

APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 2

I N S T R U C T I O N NO.

If

you

against

find

the

plaintiff

the

issues

defendant,

such

preponderance

it

damages,
of

the

in
will

if

3ct>

favor
be

any,

evidence

of

your
as

will

-the plaintiff
duty

you

may

fairly

to

award

find
and

and
the

from

a

adequately

compensate him for any injury and damage he has sustained as a
proximate result of the defendant's negligence complained of by
him.
In awarding such damages, you may consider the nature and
extent

of

the

injuries

sustained

by

him;

the

degree

and

character of his physical suffering; its probable duration and
severity, and the extent to which he has been prevented from
pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as theretofore enjoyed by
him; and any disability or loss of earning capacity resulting
from such injury.
You

may

consider whether

any

of the

above will, by a

preponderance of the evidence, continue in the future, and if
you

so

find,

award

such

damages

compensate the plaintiff therefor.

as will

fairly

and

justly

INSTRUCTION NO.

You may

award

such

special

S*P\

damages

as

you

find

from

a

preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff is entitled for:
Reasonable and necessary expenses for doctors, x-rays, and
other medical services actually incurred by plaintiff.

